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Abstract: This paper uses data from the Demographic and Health Surveys for about 30 sub-
Saharan African countries to investigate the link between the birth of an “unintended child” 
and schooling decisions of children (dropout and entry). After controlling for local unobserved 
heterogeneity, we show that the birth of an “unintended child” hinders child schooling. It 
reduces the probability of current school enrolment. As for school dynamics, it increases the 
probability that a child aged 6 to 18 years drops out of school and it decreases the probability 
that a child aged 6 to 9 years starts schooling. These results suggest that an unexpected birth 
strengthens household’s resources constraints and reduces human capital investments. The 
results  also  highlight  the  importance  of  the  timing  of  the  unexpected  birth  and  the 
heterogeneity of the effect according to child characteristics.   
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1.  Introduction  
 
During their life course, households are exposed to different type of shocks, collateral shocks 
as  well  as  idiosyncratic  ones.  One  important  source  of  idiosyncratic  shocks  stems  from 
demographic phenomena (such as fertility and mortality) that occur within the household. In 
developed  countries,  fertility  is  for  the  most  part  effectively  controlled,  while  in  many 
developing  countries,  fertility  remains  high  and  a  much  larger  share  of  childbearing  is 
unexpected. In sub-Saharan Africa, the total fertility exceeds desired fertility by almost 0.5 to 
1 child per women and unmet need for contraceptive use is quite high (between 10 and 
25%)
4. In such a specific context, when a pregnancy is unwanted, childbearing can be viewed 
as a shock. It is therefore interesting to study to what extent  unplanned children bearings 
affect household outcomes.  
A  fertility  shock  might  affect  various  household outcomes ,  including:  household  living 
conditions, children health and mortality, and children’s education. Regarding education, an 
unexpected birth within the household can be particularly damaging for children already at 
school.  Indeed,  an  unexpected  pregnancy  leads  to  a  birth  that  represents  an  unplanned 
increase in family size. The consequences  of such fertility shocks on children’s education can 
be studied within the general framework of the Quantity-Quality model (Becker and Lewis, 
1973). This model presumes that households allocate resources to each child to improve its 
quality.  A  direct  implication  of  this  model  is  a  trade-off  between  per  child  investment 
(quality) and the number of children in the family (quantity).
  
From an empirical perspective, the literature on the relation between quality and quantity of 
children is huge and diverse. The papers cover different regions in the world including the 
following  countries:  US  (Blake,  1981,  Downey,  1995),  France  (Goux  and  Maurin,  2005), 
Thailand  (Knodel et al., 1990, Knodel and Wongsith, 1991), Kenya (Gomes, 1984), Botswana  
(Chernichovsky, 1985), Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire (Montgomery et al., 1995),  Malaysia (Sudha, 
1997), China (Lu and Treiman, 2008), Hungary  (Van Eijck and De Graaf, 1995) and Cameroon 
(Eloundou-Enyegue and Williams, 2006). In the developed countries, the literature displays a 
consistent negative relationship between the number of siblings and children’s schooling 
(Becker and Lewis, 1973, Becker and Tomes, 1986, Sewell and Shah, 1968, Blake, 1981). 
However, in developing countries, the literature shows mixed conclusions. In some contexts 
a negative relationship is found (Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana), while in others a positive relationship 
is observed (Kenya, Botswana). These results raise the possibility of systematic variation in 
the relation across societies as noted by Eloundou-Enyegue and Williams (2006). 
The empirical literature treats family size either as given /exogenous or uses various sets of 
variables to instrument for its endogeneity. In the first case, the exogeneity hypothesis is 
debatable  (Morduch,  2000)  and  in  the  second  the  validity  of  the  instruments  is  also 
questionable.  Moreover,  when  studying  the  link  between  fertility  or  family  size  and 
education outcomes, most studies in developing countries use a static approach: neither the 
timing of changes in family size nor that of its effect on school outcomes is explicitly taken 
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into account. A more dynamic approach consists of both dating fertility changes and their 
impact on school outcomes.  
 
This paper focuses on changes in fertility originating from unintended pregnancies. A child 
born out of an unintended pregnancy can be treated as an unexpected shock on family size. 
This approach provides the possibility to consistently examine the effects of an exogenous 
family size variation on household decision making. It is not common in the literature and has 
been used by Montgomery and Lloyd (1999). Using DHS data, these authors analyze the 
impact  of  excess  fertility  and  unwanted  fertility  on  children’s  school  attainment  in  four 
countries  (Dominican  Republic,  Egypt, Kenya  and  the  Philippines). Their  analyses show  a 
significant negative effect of unwanted fertility and excess fertility on school attainment in 
the Dominican Republic and the Philippines. No effect is found in the other two countries. 
But it is important to mention that their outcome variable, the number of completed school 
grades,  is      a  variable  resulting  from  a  cumulative  process.  And,  on  the  other  side,  an 
unexpected pregnancy is a one-off event
5. So these authors investigate the effect of a one-off 
event (unwanted pregnancy) which occurs at a given time on the overall school outcome. In 
particular, in their setup, the timing of the unwanted fertility change in the schooling process 
of a child is not given special attention.  Another related paper is by Myhrman et al. (1995). 
Myhrman et al. show that, in Northern Finland, being a child born out of an unintended 
pregnancy increased the risk that men would not go on to upper secondary school by 6.0 
percentage  points  and  that  women  woul d  not  do  so  by  6.3  percentage  points.  The 
contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it investigates the short -run effect of having an 
unintended child on  contemporaneous school dynamics: dropout and entry of school -age 
children. Regarding dropping out, we investigate whether the presence of an unintended 
child pushes children already at school out of school. With school entry, we examine whether 
the presence of an unintended child delays school entry. In studying school entry, the sample 
is restricted to young children who have never been to school. Second, the paper uses data 
from about 30 countries, all located in sub-Saharan Africa, where the propensity of having an 
unintended child is relatively high. 
The reminder of this paper is organized as follo ws.  The next section suggests a conceptual 
framework to understand the way that an unintended birth affects ho usehold behaviors. 
Section 3 presents the data and our empirical strategy. The results, discussion and conclusion 
are respectively in sections 4 and 5. 
2.  Conceptual framework  
We assume a household utility function  that depends on two “goods”: children’s school 
achievement S and consumption good C. The contribution of child schooling to household 
utility varies with child types: girls, boys, son or daughter and fostered children. Hence..  
U=   t S S S S C U ,..., , , 3 2 , 1 0 ,where t is the number of type of children considered. 
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Let’s suppose that the price of the consumption good is normalized to one and that  fertility 
is given.  The household chooses the level of consumption and the schooling level of every 
child to maximize its utility. We also suppose that the utility function is quasi-concave and 
twice–differentiable.   
The household maximization program is given by:  
 
0 1
3 2 , 1 0 ... ,
. .
,..., , ,    :
1
R S p C t s
S S S S C U Max
t
i i i
t S S C t
  
       
where pi represent the (direct and indirect) costs of education. We allow these prices to vary 
according to child types. One important source of variation of pi is the indirect or opportunity 
cost of education. R0 represents the household’s income.  
At the optimum under the hypothesis of a fixed number of children and saturated budget 
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When a shock or an unintended pregnancy occurs and leads to an “unanticipated” birth, the 
new birth changes the economic environment of the household and leads to an additional 
fixed  costs  (k).  Hence,    total  costs  faced  by  the  household  increases  and  the  per  child  
available resources decreases. .. The budget constraint is then tightened ( 0 0 1 R k R R    ) 
and  the  household  reaches a  new  utility level  U1In  general,  households  will  adjust  both 
consumption  and  schooling  in  such  a  way  that  it  minimizes  the  lost  of  utility  due  to  a 
tightened of the budget. However, for a household that is at a subsistence consumption 
level, when an adverse shock occurs, it will only adjust children’s schooling. If the cost of 
education is identical for all children (pi= p for all i) and if parents do not discriminate among 
their children (U’si=U’ for all i), then, the education of all children will be equally affected by 
the shock.  
When  they  are  differences  in  schooling  costs  and  preferences  among  children,  the 
adjustment of schooling demand is driven by preferences and schooling costs. Let’s suppose 
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 .  If  schooling  costs  are  equal  and 
preferences are different, parents would reduce the investments in the education of children 
with higher marginal utility by less than the reduction in investments in the education of 5 
 
children with lower marginal utility
6.  If marginal utilities are  equal and costs are different, 
children with higher education cost will suffer more.  Girls and fostered children often have 
higher (opportunity) costs of education [Mason and Khander (1996), Alderman and Gertler 
(1997), Glick and Sahn (2000) Alderman and King (1998)].  
 
 
We have supposed that in case of fertility shock, the additional cost born by the household  is 
the  same  regardless  of  the  characteristics  of  the  unintended  child.  If  we  think  of 
heterogeneous cost of unintended child (k k), then, the advent of unintended children with 
different  characteristics  may  affect  differently  the  household.  It  is  conceivable  that  an 
unintended child by the spouse of the household head might affect schooling compared to 
an unintended child by a fostered girl living in the household.  
3.  Empirical strategy  
Data and descriptive analysis   
This paper uses data from Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) to investigate the link 
between the the presence of a child born out of an unintended pregnancy and schooling 
decisions (dropout and entry). The DHS program was originally developed by the U.S. Agency 
for  International  Development  (USAID).  Since  1984,  DHS  have  collected,  analyzed  and 
disseminated accurate and representative data for more than 200 surveys in more than 75 
countries.  DHS data are collected with the support of ICF Macro, based in the United States. 
The  Samples  are  representative  at  national  and  sub  national  levels.
7  DHS  survey 
methodologies and questionnaires are standardized   so that  data are comparable across 
countries. The surveys offer detailed information on various subjects, including education, 
health, as well as detailed information on women’s fertility, activities and participation in the 
decision-making process. DHS also provides interesting information for our analysis of the 
impact of recent fertility on households schooling strategies.  
We use nearly 30 DHS data sets for our analysis. Table 9A in appendix provides the list of 
countries and year of the survey.  
 Measurement 
The fertility shock measurement 
During DHS surveys, all women who had given birth during the 5 years prior to the survey 
date were asked specific questions. For each of those births, they were asked the following 
question:  “At the time when you became pregnant with *……+
8 , did you want to become 
pregnant then, did you want to wait until later, or did you not want to have any (more) 
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children at all?”Women who said they wanted to become pregnant later were additionally 
asked to indicate how much longer they wanted to wait.
9. 
Our measure of fertility  shock is defined as follows:  all households hosting a woman who 
gave birth  but who did  not wanted to become pregnant then  are considered to have 
experienced an unintended child birth or a fertility shock . Fertility shock is measured as a 
dummy variable: equals  1 when an unintended birth was reported in the household and 
equals  0  otherwise.  Following  Santelli  et  al .  (2003),  mistimed
10  pregnancies  are  not 
considered unintended
11. As indicated in figures 1 and 2 bellow, all births are dated. 
 
The schooling dynamic measurement 
DHS surveys have a well documented module on education of children aged 6 to 18 years. 
This paper uses two measurements of schooling dynamics. The first is whether or not a child 
(between 6 and18 years old) who attended school the year prior to the survey was currently 
attending school (dropout); the second dependent variable indicates whether or not a child 
(between 6 and9 years old) who was not enrolled in school during the previous year joins the 
schooling system during the survey year (entry).  









Wealth. A household wealth index is computed by adding up the number of durable goods 
owned by the household. The maximum value is 11.  From the index, the dummy variable 
Poor indicates whether the household owned only 2 items or less.  
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Using the National Survey of Family Growth, they observe that. They were few differences between intended and 
moderately mistimed pregnancies, and between seriously mistimed and unwanted pregnancies.  
 
11 In some specifications (available upon request), we explicitly account for mistimed pregnancies in two ways. 
First, we add a dummy variable for mistimed pregnancy in the regression. Second, depending on the mistimed 
period length, we consider part of mistimed pregnancies as unintended and the other part as intended. These 
alternative approaches to the data do not alter the main message of this paper.  
  T    T-2   T-1    T-3    T-4    T-5 
Year where  
school dropout 
and entrance are 




or wanted) are 
observed [T-5 ,T] 
 
Survey 
date at T 7 
 
 
The sample consists of all 574,414 children aged 6 to 18 in the countries listed. Almost half of 
them are female and the average age is 11 years. Among them, 63% were enrolled in school 
the year before the survey. They constitute the group of children at risk in studying dropping 
out.  
Regarding entrance, we are interested in first entry. The actual question is whether the 
presence in a household of a child born out of an unintended pregnancy delays school entry 
young children. Young children, aged from 6 to 9 years, are those considered for the analysis 
of  entry  to  school,  and  they  constitute  37%  of  the  sample.  The  table  1  presents  the 
descriptive statistics of the main variables.  









Mean  sd 
 
Mean  sd 
 
Mean  sd 
Unintended child 
           
0.10  0.30 
At school the year of the survey  0.63  0.69 
 
0.67  0.69 
 
0.63  0.69 
Female  0.49  0.50 
 
0.50  0.50 
 
0.49  0.50 
Age  11.27  3.65 
 
11.28  3.65 
 
11.27  3.65 
Young (aged 6 to 9 years)  0.37  0.48 
 
0.37  0.48 
 
0.37  0.48 
Son or daughter of head   0.70  0.46 
 
0.77  0.42 
 
0.71  0.45 
Wealth   2.27  2.15 
 
2.06  2.02 
 
2.25  2.13 
Poor(Dummy variable)  0.44  0.50 
 
0.48  0.50 
 
0.45  0.50 
Household size  7.66  4.14 
 
9.23  4.32 
 
7.81  4.19 
Age of head of household   47.91  13.60 
 
46.41  12.03 
 
47.77  13.46 
Female head (Dummy varaible)  0.23  0.42 
 
0.24  0.43 
 
0.23  0.42 
Head Education (years)  4.01  4.73 
 
4.45  4.36 
 
4.05  4.70 
Observation   518538 
 
55465 
   
574414 
   
 
The  proportion  of  children  living  in  a  household  with  an  unintended  child  is  10%.  This 
percentage accounts for all unintended children irrespective of their age. Figure 2 shows the 
percentage of children living in a household with an unintended child of given age. It shows 
that about 3% of children live in a household where the unintended child was born the year 
of the survey and that the proportion decrease with age. This decreasing pattern may be due 
to two factors. The first stems from potential bias due to retrospectively reporting intentions. 
Such  reports  of  intentions  are  likely  influenced  by  the  present  of  the  child.  Reported 
intentions become generally positive over time (Santelli et al. 2003). The second stems from 
potential excess mortality of children born out of unintended  pregnancies. Many studies 
have suggested  an  association  between  unintended  pregnancy  and  risk  factors  for  poor 
health outcomes (Kost et al., 1998; Altfeld et al., 1998;  Joyce et al., 2000).   
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Table 2 shows the comparison of the dropout rate and the entry rate among children living in 
households with and without an unintended child. To compute the dropout rate, we restrict 
the sample to children who were enrolled at school the year before the survey. Similarly, to 
compute the entry rate, the sample is restricted to young children who were not enrolled the 
year prior to the survey
12. The outcome of the comparison test is striking. Children living in a 
household hosting an unintended child have a significantly higher probability of dropping out 
and a lower probability of starting school. This is the main message of the paper. In the next 
section, with a regression model, we will investigate whether this message still holds when 
we take account of potential effects of other variables on dropout and entry rates.  
 
Table 2: Comparison of dropout and entrance rates  
  Dropout rate (%)  Entrance 
rate (%) 
With  an 
unintended birth 
4  25 
Without    an 
unintended birth 
3  30 
P value  0.00  0.00 
 
   
                                                           









A linear probability model of schooling 
 
We consider a child who was enrolled in school the year prior to the survey. We define the 







school in enrolled is j household of i child if 1
school in enrolled not is j household of i child if 0 k j, i, Y  
The linear probability model (LPM) is defined by 
 
𝑃  ? ??? = 1 ?  = ??,?,?
′  ? + ?𝐹 ??  + 𝐻?,? 
′   ?  +  𝑢? + ??,?,? 
 
where Xijk is a vector of child-specific covariates, Hjk are household characteristics (proxy for 
household’s wealth, head of household’s education, household size) and uk represents the 
strata fixed effect, and εi,j,k is the unobserved error term.  
The variable Fjk indicates whether an unintended birth occurred in household j in cluster k 
over the past four years prior to the survey date.  
 
The vector of covariates Xijk includes child characteristics (gender, age). The strata fixed effect 
captures all strata observed and unobserved characteristics and in particular, the supply side 
of education and price of labor.  The model is estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). 
Estimated standard errors and t statistics are heteroskedasticity-robust. Theoretically, unless 
the range of X is severely restricted, this model can lead to negative probabilities or to 
probabilities that are higher than one. However, it turns out that the LPM often seems to 
give good estimates of the partial effects on the response probability near the center of the 
distribution of covariates  (Wooldridge, 2002, chap. 15). As a robustness check,  we use 
alternative  estimators including conditional logit and  the ‘’trimmed estimator’’ (Horrace and 
Oaxaca (2006).   
 
4.  Results  
 
The main effect of unintended fertility on school dynamics (dropout and entry) 
  Table 1A in the annex shows the estimated coefficients of the regression model on 
dropping  out.  The  dependent  variable  dropout  takes  the  value  1  when  the  child  is  not 
enrolled at school the current schooling year but was enrolled the year before. The results 
indicate that the presence of a child (under five) born out of an unintended pregnancy in a 
household increases the probability that a child (aged 6 to 18) who was enrolled in school 
drops out. So, an unexpected increase in the number of children increases the dropout rate 
of children aged 6 to 18 years. The effect is significant and its magnitude is around 1%.  The 
magnitude can be considered relatively low but it is important to underline that it  is an 
annual rate. The medium-term cumulative effect might turn out to be very important.  10 
 
Table 2A shows the estimated coefficients of the regression model on school entry. The 
dependent variable school entry takes the value 1 when the child is enrolled the current 
schooling year but was not enrolled the year before. The school entry rate of children aged 6-
9 years old is also significantly lower for children living in a household with an unintended 
child (table 2A). Actually, the entry rate falls by 1.2% when a household faces a fertility shock. 
Thus, the presence of a child born out of an unintended pregnancy has a negative impact on 
schooling. In particular it delays first school entry. It is important to stress the fact that we 
have controlled for supply side factors through cluster fixed effects and  then our results 
reflect the intrinsic constraints faced by households. 
Is there any long-lasting effect? 
Whereas we can only observe school dynamics (dropout or entry) between the previous year 
and the year of survey, DHS data record the status of all the births (wanted/unwanted) that 
occurred  during  the  last  five  years  before  each  survey  (Figure  1).  It’s  then  possible  to 
disentangle the effect of fertility shock according to the age of the unintended child (within 
the five-year interval preceding the survey) and then to elaborate on the nature the link. Is 
the timing of the shock of interest?  
The results (table 3A in annex) show that the effect of fertility shock on school entry and 
dropout seems to be transitory. Indeed, the effect of the presence of an unintended child on 
dropping out declines over time, from 1.4% the year of the birth to 0.76% one year after the 
fertility shock. Beyond the second year the coefficients become very low and not statistically 
significant.  Regarding  school  entry,  the  effect  of  the  presence  of  an  unintended  child  is 
restricted to the year of birth. An unintended birth reduces the entry rate by 2.7% the birth 
year, and there is no effect at all afterward.  
But  the  immediate  link  between  unexpected  birth  and  school  entry  or  exit  should  not 
attenuate its damaging effect for at least two reasons. First, children who drop out from 
school lost years of education. Second, giving that childbearing spans a longer period of time, 
the consequences of an unintended birth might end up having a long-term effect on the total 
number of grades in school that a child would accumulate throughout his schooling course.  
 
Household wealth effect  
The second source of heterogeneity of the fertility shock effect is household position in the 
wealth  distribution.  If  the  household  belongs  to  the  poorest  group,  then  in  case  of  an 
exogenous  adverse  fertility  shock,  given  that  it  cannot  reduce  its  consumption  of  other 
goods, the only adjustment mechanism would be through reducing schooling expenditures. 
Investment in education would be sacrificed. The analysis confirms this assertion, but with a 
nuance according to the school dynamic considered (exit or entry). In case of fertility shock, 
dropping children out from school is a strategy used by almost all the households whatever 
their position in the wealth distribution (table 1A). This result reflects the burden of a fertility 
shock. Even non-poor households need to adjust their behavior to cope with such a shock. 
Regarding school entry (table 2A), the presence of an unintended child seems to negatively 
affect school entry only among the poor. The effect is significant and its magnitude is about 11 
 
1.3%. Unlike the poor, the presence of an unintended child has no effect on child school 
entry among non-poor households.   
The  fact  that  adjustment  via  dropout  is  similar  along  the  wealth  distribution  while 
adjustment via entry is essentially used only by poor households could be interpreted as 
follows:  in case of an exogenous shock, dropping some children from school is sufficient to 
reach another acceptable equilibrium for wealthier households while poorer ones need an 
additional severe adjustment which occurs through reducing school enrollment of 6-9 year 
old children. 
Fertility shock and gender of the schooling child 
In  discussing  the  interaction  of  gender  with  fertility  shock,  we  begin  with  a  look  at  its 
marginal effect. Everything else being equal, girls face a higher risk than boys of not being 
enrolled in school and of dropping out (tables 1A and 2A). This is very often observed in 
developing countries. Column 5 of table 1A reveals that, when a household experiences a 
fertility shock, the schooling situation of girls worsens as the dropout rate almost doubles. At 
least two mechanisms can be put forward to explain this configuration. The first may be the 
fact that girls’ education is less valued than education of boys in the household. So when 
household faces adverse shock that reduces per child resources, the “optimal” adjustment is 
to  reduce  investment  in  girls’  quality  rather  than  in  that  of  boys.  We  can  call  this  a 
“preference” mechanism. The second one is more specific to childbearing shock: a new baby 
needs care and rearing. These activities are traditionally devoted to women and girls, a sort 
of  specialization  in  housework.  So  a  birth,  especially  an  unexpected  one,  increases  the 
opportunity cost of girls’ schooling. The school dropping out could reflect, for some girls, this 
increase. When considering school entry, girls do not face an additional disadvantage due to 
the arrival of a new baby (Column 5 table 2a).  
Fertility shock and the relationship to household head of the schooling child   
In the African context, child fostering is a widespread practice and is very often described as 
reflecting some form of extended-family solidarity. Yet it’s unclear whether fostered children 
receive  equivalent  investment  in  human  capital  as  that  of  the  household  head’s  own 
children.  Some studies conclude that fostered children are discriminated against whereas 
others come out with opposite results (Pilon. 2003 provides a literature review). In this study, 
it appears that fostered children face higher dropout rates. The probability of dropping out is 
1.2% higher for fostered children. Children of the household head are also more likely to 
start schooling compared to fostered children (table 1A and 2A). When an unexpected birth 
occurs in a given household, fostered kids’ probability of dropping out of school  is 1.2% 
compared to 0.41% for the household head’s own children. So this result tends to suggest 
that in case of adverse shocks, consequences are transferred on to fostered children even 
though they are already initially disadvantaged. Regarding school entry, there is no additional 
disadvantage due to fertility shock.  
The newborn characteristics (relationship to the household’s head) also matter. 
 
As stated in the conceptual framework, the importance given to each newborn (through the 
amount or resources devoted to him, k) may depend on its relationship to the household 12 
 
head.. Given that in this study we suppose that the effect of unexpected childbearing passes 
through the tightening of the resource constraint, we should expect the impact of child 
bearing on school outcomes to vary according to the relationship of the newborn to the head 
of the household.  In table 4A, we investigate the effect of the unintended birth according to 
whether the birth is by the spouse of the household head or not. The results in table 4A show 
that  unexpected  child  bearing  from  the  household  head  spouse  positively  affects  school 
dropout and negatively influences school entry. But when the additional baby belongs to a 
secondary
13 female household member, it hardly influences school entry.  
 
The effect of unintended fertility on current school enrolment  
Finally, we look at the average effect of living in a household with an unintended child on 
school enrolment. Table 7A shows the estimated coefficients of the regression model  of 
school enrolment. The dependent variable takes the value 1 when the child was enrolled in 
school the year of the survey. The model is estimated for all children aged 6 to 18. The table 
shows that, on average, living in a household that hosts a child born out of an unintended 




Horrace and Oaxaca (2006) stress the bias and inconsistency of OLS on the linear probability 
model and suggest that a ‘’trimmed estimator’’ may reduce OLS bias. We implement the 
“trimmed estimator” proposed by restricting the sample size to observations for which the 
predicted probabilities are between 0 and 1. The trimmed sample represents 86% of the 
initial sample on dropout. In the case of school entry, all predicted values are between 0 and 
1. The results from the estimated “trimmed estimator” (table 5A) are qualitatively similar. 
 
The alternative to the LPM would be a fixed-effects Logit model. The condition fixed-effects 
Logit model is not suitable in this case because only clusters that display some heterogeneity 
in the outcome variable are taken into account in estimating the model. The requirement is 
very  binding  in  this  set-up  because  in  many  clusters  in  our  sample, even  when  children 
characteristics are different, the outcome variable takes only either the value one or the 
value zero. That is, all children in those clusters are either in or out of school. Discarding 
them would be ignoring important variations in the whole schooling process. However, Table 
6A  shows  estimated  coefficients  of  a  conditional  fixed-effects  logit.  It  also  shows  the 
reduction in sample sizes. For school dropout, the sample is reduced by  50%. Regarding 
school entry, the sample is reduced by 22%. It is striking to observe that, even on these sub-
samples, the patterns of our results remains. 
Finally, we restricted the sample used to estimate dropout, entry and school enrolment to 
households that have witness a new-born over the five years prior to the survey data. The 
restriction allows identifying the effect of having an unintended birth as compared to that of 
having a child born out of a wanted pregnancy. The results are shown  in table  8A. The 
                                                           
13 i.e who is not the spouse of the head of household, nor the household head herself 13 
 
coefficient  of  the  variable  unintended  birth  suggests  that,  compared  to  intended  birth, 
unintended still have a damaging effect on schooling and schooling dynamics.  
5.  Conclusion  
 
When  family  planning  is  widespread,  fertility  is  largely  under  control  and  births  due  to 
unexpected  pregnancies  are  unusual.  In  such  contexts,  families  with  given  preferences 
(observable and unobservable) and constraints, first desire a kid and then give birth after. On 
the contrary, in many developing countries, and especially in the African context, effective 
contraceptive methods, even when available, are seldom used. Some children are born out 
of an unintended pregnancy. The birth of unintended child is unexpected and can be viewed 
as a shock that households must cope with. In this study we focus on impacts of this shock on 
household schooling investments. More specifically, we are interested in changes in school 
entry  and  dropout  following  the  birth  of  an  unintended  child.  We  use  nearly  30  DHS 
databases on 20 sub-Saharan African countries. All surveys were conducted after the year 
2000. The surveys make it possible to capture recent school dynamics on the one hand, and 
on the other, to identify children born out of unintended pregnancies among births that 
occurred  within  a  five-year  interval  prior  to  the  surveys.  To  measure  the  effect  of  this 
unexpected childbearing on schooling, we use a linear probability model (LPM) and control 
for unobservable heterogeneity with fixed-effects. The results show that fertility shocks lead 
to an underinvestment in young children’s education. That is, when an unexpected birth 
occurs in a given household, all else equal, it reduces the probability of first school entry of 
children aged 6 to 9 years and increases the dropout rate of children aged 6 to 18 years 
already in school. This paper also investigates whether the heterogeneity of fertility shocks is 
relevant  for  schooling.  Do  gender  and  the  relationship  to  the  household  head  of  the 
unintended child affect schooling differently? In parallel, are some children more affected by 
the  fertility  shock?  The  results  suggest  that  an  unintended  birth  that  occurs  during  the 
current  academic  year  is  more  damaging  for  current  school  enrolment  than  those  that 
occurred 2 to 4 years prior to the academic year. In addition, an unintended child of the 
household head has a more damaging effect than an unintended child of other household 
members. 
The results suggest that children of the household head are less affected by the presence of 
an unintended child in the household compared to other children living in the household. 
Female children are more affected by the presence of an unintended child in the household 
than male. Overall, the results of this paper suggest that the presence of child born out of an 
unintended pregnancy in a household  affect negatively current schooling. Such  an effect 
could have long-lasting consequences on human capital accumulation. Pushing for effective 
use of contraception should thus remain in the policy agenda of African policy makers. 
    14 
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Table 1A: LPM of recent fertility shock on current school drop-out of children aged 6-18 years 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
VARIABLES  All_  Poorer  Richer  Male  Female  Son/daughter of hh 
head 
Other children 
               
Unintended birth  0.0057***  0.0064***  0.0050***  0.0012  0.0102***  0.0041***  0.0122*** 
  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.003) 
Son or daughter of the head  -0.0121***  -0.0073***  -0.0155***  -0.0084***  -0.0160***     
  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)     
Female  0.0064***  0.0074***  0.0060***      0.0043***  0.0108*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)      (0.001)  (0.001) 
Age  0.0097***  0.0103***  0.0091***  0.0088***  0.0108***  0.0085***  0.0115*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Wealth proxy  -0.0025***  -0.0039***  -0.0018***  -0.0022***  -0.0029***  -0.0026***  -0.0026*** 
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Schooling delay
14  0.0021***  0.0012**  0.0023***  0.0027***  0.0017***  0.0023***  0.0015*** 
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Household size  -0.0004***  -0.0007***  -0.0004***  -0.0005***  -0.0003**  -0.0004**  -0.0004* 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Head of household age  -0.0001***  -0.0001**  -0.0002***  -0.0001**  -0.0002***  0.0002***  -0.0002*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Female headed household  -0.0043***  -0.0036**  -0.0060***  -0.0047***  -0.0043***  0.0002  -0.0071*** 
  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Head of household education  -0.0007***  -0.0015***  -0.0005***  -0.0007***  -0.0007***  -0.0007***  -0.0010*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Constant  -0.0511***  -0.0577***  -0.0457***  -0.0444***  -0.0539***  -0.0642***  -0.0724*** 
  (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.006) 
               
Observations  341,235  127,815  213,420  178,016  163,219  240,651  100,584 
R-squared  0.025  0.024  0.027  0.020  0.032  0.021  0.031 
Number of strata  13,194  10,620  11,900  13,102  12,841  13,137  12,037 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
                                                           
14 This variable measures the difference between hypothetical grade of a child and its current grade. The hypothetical grade is computed under the assumption that the child starts schooling 
at the age of 6 and advances one grade every year. 18 
 
Table 2A: LPM of recent fertility shock on current school entry of children aged 6-9 years 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
  All_  Poorer  Richer  Male  Female  Son/daughter of hh 
head 
Other children 
               
Unintended birth  -0.0116**  -0.0127**  -0.0059  -0.0052  -0.0088  -0.0078  -0.0063 
  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.013) 
Son or daughter of the head  0.0240***  0.0148***  0.0368***  0.0153***  0.0283***     
  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)     
female  -0.0072***  -0.0041  -0.0131***      -0.0086***  0.0039 
  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.004)      (0.003)  (0.006) 
age  0.0429***  0.0480***  0.0370***  0.0479***  0.0382***  0.0469***  0.0391*** 
  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.003) 
Wealth proxy  0.0292***  0.0298***  0.0280***  0.0294***  0.0287***  0.0303***  0.0287*** 
  (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
Household size  -0.0024***  -0.0031***  -0.0016***  -0.0034***  -0.0017***  -0.0026***  -0.0012 
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Head of household age  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0003  -0.0000  -0.0002  -0.0010***  0.0009*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Female headed household  0.0167***  0.0135***  0.0268***  0.0110*  0.0237***  0.0009  0.0304*** 
  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.008) 
Head of household education  0.0106***  0.0102***  0.0099***  0.0109***  0.0106***  0.0116***  0.0086*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Constant  -0.1133***  -0.1324***  -0.0777***  -0.1333***  -0.0926***  -0.0913***  -0.1060*** 
  (0.011)  (0.015)  (0.019)  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.012)  (0.026) 
               
Observations  115,404  64,706  50,698  58,181  57,223  87,785  27,619 
R-squared  0.028  0.026  0.024  0.031  0.027  0.033  0.022 
Number of strata  12,141  9,480  9,728  11,160  11,060  11,446  9,417 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table 3A LPM of recent fertility shock on current school entry and dropout: timing of the 
unexpected birth 
  (1)  (2) 
VARIABLES  Dropout  Entry 
     
Unintended birth the year of survey  0.0139***  -0.0273*** 
  (0.002)  (0.008) 
Unintended birth in year before survey  0.0076***  0.0023 
  (0.002)  (0.009) 
Unintended birth two years before survey  0.0027  -0.0155 
  (0.002)  (0.009) 
Unintended birth three years before survey  0.0002  -0.0002 
  (0.002)  (0.009) 
Unintended birth four years before survey  -0.0035  -0.0107 
  (0.002)  (0.010) 
Son or daughter of the head  -0.0120***  0.0241*** 
  (0.001)  (0.003) 
Female  0.0063***  -0.0073*** 
  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Age  0.0097***  0.0429*** 
  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Wealth proxy  -0.0025***  0.0292*** 
  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Schooling delay  0.0021***   
  (0.000)   
Household size  -0.0005***  -0.0023*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Head of household age  -0.0001***  -0.0001 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Female headed household  -0.0043***  0.0167*** 
  (0.001)  (0.004) 
Head of household education  -0.0007***  0.0106*** 
  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Constant  -0.0513***  -0.1134*** 
  (0.003)  (0.011) 
     
Observations  341,235  115,404 
R-squared  0.026  0.029 
Number of strata  13,194  12,141 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Schooling delay measures the difference between hypothetical grade of a child and its current grade. 
The hypothetical grade is computed under the assumption that the child starts schooling at the age 
of 6 and advances one grade every year. 
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Table 4A LPM of a spouse fertility shock on current school entry and dropout: effect unintended 
head’s child 
  (1)  (2) 
VARIABLES  Dropout  Entry 
     
Unintended head's child  0.0032**  -0.0135*** 
  (0.001)  (0.005) 
Unintended non head's child  0.0129***  0.0017 
  (0.003)  (0.012) 
Son or daughter of the head  -0.0118***  0.0245*** 
  (0.001)  (0.003) 
Female  0.0063***  -0.0072*** 
  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Age  0.0097***  0.0429*** 
  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Wealth proxy  -0.0025***  0.0292*** 
  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Schooling delay  0.0021***   
  (0.000)   
Household size  -0.0005***  -0.0024*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Head of household age  -0.0001***  -0.0001 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Female headed household  -0.0045***  0.0166*** 
  (0.001)  (0.004) 
Head of household education  -0.0007***  0.0106*** 
  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Constant  -0.0506***  -0.1134*** 
  (0.003)  (0.011) 
     
Observations  341,235  115,404 
R-squared  0.026  0.028 
Number of strata  13,194  12,141 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Schooling delay measures the difference between hypothetical grade of a child and its current 
grade. The hypothetical grade is computed under the assumption that the child starts schooling at 
the age of 6 and advances one grade every year. 
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Table 5A: Estimated LPM on a trimmed sample (Horrace and Oaxaca procedure) 
  (1)  (2) 
VARIABLES  dropout  entry 
     
Unintended child  0.0076***  -0.0116** 
  (0.001)  (0.005) 
Son or daughter of the head  -0.0160***  0.0240*** 
  (0.001)  (0.003) 
Female  0.0095***  -0.0072*** 
  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Age  0.0129***  0.0429*** 
  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Wealth proxy  -0.0036***  0.0292*** 
  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Schooling delay  0.0031***   
  (0.000)   
Household size  -0.0006***  -0.0024*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Head of household age  -0.0002***  -0.0001 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Female-headed household  -0.0057***  0.0167*** 
  (0.001)  (0.004) 
Head of household education  -0.0011***  0.0106*** 
  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Constant  -0.0840***  -0.1133*** 
  (0.004)  (0.011) 
     
Observations  294,609  115,404 
R-squared  0.029  0.028 
Number of strata  13,187  12,141 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Schooling delay measures the difference between hypothetical grade of a child and its current 
grade. The hypothetical grade is computed under the assumption that the child starts schooling at 
the age of 6 and advances one grade every year. 
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Table 6A   : Conditional fixed effect logit model and LPM of school dropout (same sample for clogit 
and LPM) 
  (1)  (2) 
  Clogit  LPM 
The dependant variable is dropout      
     
Unintended child  0.1928***  0.0101*** 
  (0.036)  (0.002) 
Son or daughter of the head  -0.3997***  -0.0227*** 
  (0.024)  (0.002) 
Female  0.2623***  0.0119*** 
  (0.022)  (0.001) 
Age  0.3886***  0.0186*** 
  (0.006)  (0.000) 
Wealth proxy  -0.1106***  -0.0051*** 
  (0.009)  (0.000) 
Schooling delay  0.0855***  0.0038*** 
  (0.006)  (0.000) 
Household size  -0.0143***  -0.0008*** 
  (0.004)  (0.000) 
Head of household age  -0.0030***  -0.0002*** 
  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Female headed household  -0.1474***  -0.0083*** 
  (0.027)  (0.002) 
Head of household education  -0.0357***  -0.0015*** 
  (0.003)  (0.000) 
Constant    -0.1000*** 
    (0.006) 
     
Observations  170,727  170,727 
R-squared    0.050 
Number of strata    5,798 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Schooling delay measures the difference between hypothetical grade of a child and its current 
grade. The hypothetical grade is computed under the assumption that the child starts schooling at 
the age of 6 and advances one grade every year. 
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Table 6A   : Conditional fixed effect logit model and LPM of school entry (same sample for clogit and 
LPM) 
  (1)  (2) 
  clogit  LPM 
The dependant variable is school 
entry 
   
     
Unintended child  -0.0794**  -0.0149** 
  (0.032)  (0.006) 
Son or daughter of the head  0.1753***  0.0314*** 
  (0.024)  (0.004) 
Female  -0.0524***  -0.0098*** 
  (0.018)  (0.003) 
Age  0.3378***  0.0587*** 
  (0.009)  (0.002) 
Wealth proxy  0.1951***  0.0373*** 
  (0.009)  (0.002) 
Household size  -0.0176***  -0.0031*** 
  (0.003)  (0.001) 
Head of household age  -0.0007  -0.0001 
  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Female headed household  0.1309***  0.0235*** 
  (0.026)  (0.005) 
Head of household education  0.0618***  0.0128*** 
  (0.003)  (0.001) 
Constant    -0.1863*** 
    (0.015) 
     
Observations  85,233  85,233 
R-squared    0.037 
Number of strata    8,153 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7A: LPM of recent fertility shock on current school enrolment of children aged 6-18 years 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
  All_  Poorer  Richer  Male  Female  Son/daughter of hh head  Other children 
The    dependant  variable  is 
current school enrolment 
             
               
Unintended birth  -0.0157***  -0.0200***  -0.0102***  -0.0044  -0.0264***  -0.0132***  -0.0226*** 
  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.005) 
Son or daughter of the head  0.0782***  0.0465***  0.1018***  0.0598***  0.0926***     
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)     
female  -0.0382***  -0.0320***  -0.0422***      -0.0322***  -0.0453*** 
  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)      (0.001)  (0.002) 
age  -0.0039***  0.0012***  -0.0075***  0.0002  -0.0083***  0.0028***  -0.0129*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Wealth proxy  0.0219***  0.0388***  0.0166***  0.0221***  0.0215***  0.0261***  0.0142*** 
  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Household size  -0.0001  -0.0005  0.0000  -0.0004  0.0003  0.0000  -0.0003 
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Head of household age  0.0009***  0.0009***  0.0009***  0.0008***  0.0011***  -0.0009***  0.0011*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Female headed household  0.0340***  0.0306***  0.0438***  0.0345***  0.0344***  0.0067***  0.0456*** 
  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
Head  of  household 
education 
0.0090***  0.0133***  0.0075***  0.0094***  0.0088***  0.0105***  0.0072*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Constant  0.5136***  0.4277***  0.5922***  0.4840***  0.5126***  0.5684***  0.6860*** 
  (0.005)  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.008) 
               
Observations  574,407  256,317  318,090  293,974  280,433  407,706  166,701 
R-squared  0.023  0.012  0.031  0.018  0.028  0.022  0.022 
Number of strata  13,484  11,505  12,304  13,473  13,468  13,468  13,310 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 25 
 
Table 8A: LPM of recent fertility shock on dropout, entry and current school enrolment of children 
(sample restricted to households with new born) 




       
Unintended birth  0.0036**  -0.0078  -0.0052** 
  (0.001)  (0.005)  (0.003) 
Son or daughter of the head  -0.0150***  0.0377***  0.0960*** 
  (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.002) 
Female  0.0085***  -0.0081***  -0.0506*** 
  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.002) 
Age  0.0087***  0.0458***  -0.0002 
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Wealth proxy  -0.0028***  0.0288***  0.0244*** 
  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
Schooling delay  0.0014***     
  (0.000)     
Household size  -0.0007***  -0.0019***  0.0012*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Head of household age  -0.0000  -0.0003**  0.0004*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Female headed household  -0.0017  0.0093*  0.0280*** 
  (0.001)  (0.005)  (0.003) 
Head of household education  -0.0008***  0.0108***  0.0106*** 
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Constant  -0.0400***  -0.1483***  0.4310*** 
  (0.004)  (0.014)  (0.006) 
       
Observations  178,593  80,527  328,404 
R-squared  0.025  0.032  0.027 
Number of strata  12,912  11,142  13,378 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Schooling delay measures the difference between hypothetical grade of a child and its current 
grade. The hypothetical grade is computed under the assumption that the child starts schooling at 
the age of 6 and advances one grade every year 
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Table 9A: List of countries and years of the DHS survey. 
Country  Year (s) of the 
survey (s) 
Benin  2001, 2006 
Burkina Faso  2003 
Cameroon   2004 
Congo.   2005 
Democratic Republic of Congo.   2007, 
Ethiopia   2000, 2005 
Ghana   2003, 2008 
Kenya   2003, 2008 
Guinea   2005 
Lesotho   2004 
Liberia   2007 
Madagascar   2003-04, 2008-09 
Malawi   2000, 2004 
Mali   2001, 2006 
Mozambique   2003 
Namibia   2000, 2006-07 
Niger   2006 
Nigeria   2003, 2008 
Senegal   2005 
Tanzania   2004-05 
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